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Introduction
When Californian voters passed the first modern medical marijuana ballot measure in 1996, it was hard to imagine federal law
might ever change to accommodate it. At the time, then–drug czar
Barry McCaffrey called the law “a cruel hoax that sounds more like
something out of a Cheech and Chong show.”1 The Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) threatened to go after the controlled substances licenses of doctors who recommended medical marijuana,2 and
the House of Representatives passed a symbolic “Not Legalizing
Marijuana for Medical Use” sense of Congress resolution by a vote of
310 to 93.3
†

Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice,
Thomas Jefferson School of Law.

1.

Peter Hecht, Weedland: Inside America’s Marijuana Epicenter
and How Pot Went Legit 67 (2014).

2.

Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (“[T]he DEA will
seek to revoke the DEA registrations of physicians who recommend or
prescribe Schedule I controlled substances.”). The Ninth Circuit
enjoined the plan on First Amendment grounds. Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).

3.

See Caroline Herman, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative: Whatever Happened to Federalism?, 93 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 121, 123–24 n.19 (2002) (discussing the “sense of
Congress” vote).
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Even as more and more states followed California’s lead and
passed medical marijuana laws of their own, little changed at the
federal level. By one estimate, the federal government spent $483
million dollars interfering with state medical marijuana laws between
1996 and 2012, conducting at least 528 raids and dozens of prosecutions of people operating in compliance with state medical marijuana
laws.4
By the time Colorado and Washington took state reforms even
further in 2012 with laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use,
federal marijuana laws and enforcement policies stood in roughly the
same place as they had back in 1996. If anything, the Obama administration’s actions on medical marijuana—vigorously raiding and prosecuting state operators despite a 2008 campaign pledge5 and a 2009
Department of Justice memo6 that indicated he would do just the
opposite—made the prospect of change at the federal level seem even
bleaker.7
Somewhat suddenly, however, the last two years have seen the
once-impossible idea of reforming federal marijuana law become seemingly inevitable.8 In late 2013, the Department of Justice announced a
new round of marijuana enforcement guidelines.9 The text of the
4.

Peace for Patients, Americans for Safe Access, What’s the
Cost? The Federal War on Patients 3, 16 (2013), available at
http://american-safe-access.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/WhatsTheCost.
pdf.

5.

Tim Dickenson, Obama’s War on Pot, Rolling Stone (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-2010216
(reporting that as a candidate President Obama said, “I’m not going to
be using Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws
on this issue”).

6.

Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen. for Selected
United States Attorneys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States
Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available at
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192.

7.

See, e.g., Dickenson, supra note 5 (“[O]ver the past year, the Obama
administration has quietly unleashed a multiagency crackdown on medical cannabis that goes far beyond anything undertaken by George W.
Bush.”); Alex Kreit, Reflections on State Medical Marijuana
Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek Justice, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1027,
1036–41 (2012) (discussing the aftermath of the 2009 Department of
Justice memo on federal medical marijuana prosecutions).

8.

See Eliana Dockterman, Poll: Three in Four Say Legalized Pot Is
Inevitable, Time (Apr. 2, 2014), http://time.com/47007/poll-three-in-foursay-legalized-pot-is-inevitable/.

9.

Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all United
States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29,
2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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DOJ’s 2013 guidance is not all that different from its largely ignored
2009 memorandum. This time, however, federal prosecutors and the
DEA have mostly abided by the advice. As a result, stores are selling
marijuana in Colorado and Washington as openly as they would any
other consumer good. Perhaps even more notable, the 2015 federal
budget included an appropriations rider banning the Department of
Justice from spending money to block the implementation of state
medical marijuana laws.10 Taken together, these two developments
suggest the executive and legislative branches are finally coming
around to the conclusion that enforcing federal marijuana prohibition
in states that have enacted reform is simply no longer a viable option.
But if uniformly enforced federal marijuana prohibition is no
longer sustainable, what should a new policy look like? Perhaps because the prospect of a move away from federal marijuana prohibition
has seemed so remote for so long, there has not been much serious
dialogue about the pros and cons of the various alternatives. Marijuana legalization advocates have been focused on lobbying for any
politically viable short-term workaround to the conflict between state
and federal law, not crafting a policy for the long-term. Prohibitionists, meanwhile, have been sticking with a run-out-the-clock strategy,
betting on the hope that the medical and recreational marijuana
legalization trend will eventually reverse itself and working to keep
federal marijuana laws untouched until that day comes.
So much energy has been directed at the debate about whether to
change federal marijuana laws that the question of how to change
them has been almost an afterthought. Barring a dramatic political
reversal, however, it is no longer a matter of whether but when, and
that makes the how of federal marijuana reform increasingly
important. Instead of trying to find the best short-term fix to the
current state–federal conflict, it is time to start thinking seriously
about what federal marijuana policy should look like for the next
forty or fifty years. This Article aims to help further the dialogue on
this question. My goal is not to advocate for any particular solution
or consider any one option in detail, but instead to highlight some of
the considerations that might guide the debate and some of the tradeoffs different sorts of policies might entail. I argue that the federal
10.

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014) (“None of the funds made
available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used, with
respect to the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such States from
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”).

691

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?

marijuana reform ideas that have generated the most political interest
and momentum so far (appropriations provisos and affirmative defense proposals) suffer from serious flaws that make them unlikely to
be attractive long-term options. Instead, more sweeping changes to
federal law are likely necessary to harmonize state and federal
marijuana law. And, though perhaps counterintuitive, there are
reasons legalization opponents may also come to reluctantly accept
ideas like federal marijuana regulation or state waiver programs as the
best option for addressing some of their biggest concerns as legalization moves forward.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly lays out the
case for why federal law must change to accommodate state marijuana reforms and why, although perhaps not politically viable today,
change is nevertheless inevitable and may come much sooner than
many think. Part II considers the types of federal marijuana reform
proposals that have generated interest and analyzes which is most
likely to effectively end the conflict between state and federal
marijuana law. Part III looks at the idea of federal marijuana law
from the perspective of marijuana legalization opponents and skeptics.
Though people in this category might prefer nationwide marijuana
prohibition, if that is not a viable option in the long-term, what federal policy would be most likely to effectively address their central
concerns about legalization?

I.

Why Federal Marijuana Law Reform Is
Both Necessary and Inevitable

Walking around Denver, Colorado, or leafing through the Wall
Street Journal, it would be easy to forget that federal law still criminalizes the distribution,11 manufacture,12 and even simple possession of
marijuana.13 State-legal marijuana stores openly sell millions of
dollars’ worth of marijuana in Colorado,14 seemingly unconcerned by
the lengthy federal sentences their operators are risking.15 Meanwhile,
angel investors pump money into marijuana ventures like Eaze, a
11.

The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).

12.

Id.

13.

Id. § 844(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance.”).

14.

Christopher Ingraham, Colorado Marijuana Revenues Hit a New High,
Wash. Post Wonkblog (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/10/14/colorado-marijuana-revenueshit-a-new-high/ (reporting that approximately $34.1 million worth of
recreational marijuana was sold in Colorado in August 2014).

15.

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (providing for a mandatory
minimum sentence of ten years for the distribution of 1,000 or more
marijuana plants or 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana).
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“high-tech pot-delivery service”16—or, in the eyes of federal drug laws,
a sophisticated conspiracy to illegally distribute a controlled
substance.
The disconnect between the letter of federal law and the emerging
marijuana industry is, in large part, the result of an August 2013
Department of Justice (DOJ) memo advising federal prosecutors not
to interfere with state marijuana legalization laws.17 The memo cautions that it “is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion” and does not give state-compliant
marijuana operators any legally enforceable rights or protection.18 But
enough marijuana operators have put their confidence in the DOJ’s
nonbinding guidance that it has proven to be a relatively effective
short-term answer to the state-federal marijuana conflict, at least so
far. With marijuana businesses operating openly, it is fair to ask
whether the state–federal marijuana conflict has already been solved.
Does Congress really need to change federal law, or can federal
prohibition and state legalization comfortably coexist through an
executive nonenforcement policy?
Though the DOJ’s marijuana nonenforcement policy could
continue indefinitely in theory, it is not a long-term solution for
several reasons. First, prosecutorial guidance is just that—guidance. A
new Attorney General could decide to change the policy.19 If that
happens, the people investing in marijuana delivery startups today
could be facing federal drug charges tomorrow. Because their actions
violate existing federal law, there would be no ex post facto bar to
prosecuting marijuana business operators for conduct they undertook
while the nonenforcement prosecutorial guidance was in effect. As a
result, every Colorado marijuana business owner who employs an
16.

Timothy Hay, “Uber for Pot” Eaze Raises $1.5 Million to Deliver
Medical Marijuana, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/11/05/uber-for-pot-eaze-raises1-5-million-to-deliver-medical-marijuana/.

17.

Cole Memo, supra note 9.

18.

Id. at 4.

19.

See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 74, 90 (2015) (observing
that making a federal nonenforcement policy permanent “cannot be
done by executive action alone because enforcement decisions made by
one presidential administration could easily be overturned by the next”);
Vikas Bajaj, Op-Ed., Will the Next Attorney General Crack Down on
Marijuana?, N.Y. Times Take Note Blog (Jan. 29, 2015), http://
mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/takingnote/2015/01/29/will-the-next-attor
ney-general-crack-down-on-marijuana/ (reporting on the confirmation
for Loretta Lynch, President Obama’s nominee to replace Eric Holder as
Attorney General, and observing that “Lynch’s statements serve as a
reminder that the Obama administration’s policy on marijuana could
easily be reversed”).
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armed security guard could wind up serving an effective life sentence
in federal prison20 when a new President is sworn into office in
January 2017, even if they closed their doors in November 2016.
Indeed, even while the policy is in place, a disobedient federal prosecutor could simply ignore it.21 Because the policy is only advisory, it
does not give state-legal marijuana operators who rely on it a defense
in federal court.22
Second, even if the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy could reliably
shield marijuana businesses from federal criminal prosecution, it does
not solve the conflict between federal prohibition and state legalization entirely. As Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Foran, Allen Hopper,
and Sam Kamin explain in their recent article Cooperative Federalism
and Marijuana Regulation, there are a number of “substantial
obstacles to businesses and adults seeking to implement and avail
themselves of new state laws authorizing marijuana distribution and
use” that cannot be solved by prosecutorial discretion alone.23 These
obstacles include access to banks, which are far less likely to be
persuaded by advisory guidance24; access to attorneys, who may face
ethics charges for facilitating federally illegal drug operations25; a
“crippling” federal tax penalty for marijuana businesses26; and risks to
20.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) provides for stiff mandatory minimum sentences for the use of a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See,
e.g., United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah
2004) (imposing a fifty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) for a defendant who carried a handgun to two
marijuana sales and possessed guns in his home), aff’d 433 F.3d 738
(10th Cir. 2006).

21.

See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of
Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 633, 643–45 (2011) (explaining that “the DOJ is [a] fragmented
agency, one in which several autonomous decision makers help share
enforcement policy” and that not all U.S. Attorneys support the guidance issued by the DOJ in Washington).

22.

See, e.g., United Sates v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (S.D. Cal.
2010).

23.

Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 90–91.

24.

Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 597 (2015) (arguing that banking will continue to present
“urgent” problems to the marijuana industry because banks do not want
to risk noncompliance with federal law).

25.

Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91
Or. L. Rev. 869 (2013) (discussing how attorneys who represent
state-legal marijuana businesses might risk running afoul of ethics laws
because all lawyers have a duty to not “knowingly assist criminal
conduct”).

26.

Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 94; see also, e.g., Benjamin Moses
Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523 (2014)

694

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?

users in the form of potential adverse employment, probation and
parole, and family law consequences.27 Federal prohibition also leaves
marijuana businesses with a great deal of uncertainty when it comes
to intellectual property rights,28 the availability of insurance, and even
the enforceability of standard business contracts.29 While it is possible
some of these hurdles can be overcome in whole or in part without
legislative action, others are almost certain to remain.
Third, the continuing nonenforcement of federal drug laws would
raise serious concerns about the limits of executive power. In his
recent article Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, Zachary
Price considers the federal government’s response to state marijuana
legalization laws.30 Price argues that while “[s]ome degree of top-down
direction regarding” Justice Department resources may be
appropriate, “a more definite nonenforcement policy . . . would exceed
the Executive’s proper role by effectively suspending a federal statute
and thus usurping Congress’s constitutional responsibility to set
national policy.”31 The longer the federal government goes without
prosecuting or otherwise interfering with32 marijuana businesses, the
more definite its nonenforcement policy effectively becomes. To be
sure, as a matter of legal doctrine on executive discretion, it is quite
likely that the DOJ’s marijuana nonenforcement policy could continue
(discussing Internal Revenue Code § 280E, which requires sellers of
federally illegal drugs to pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of
their net income).
27.

See generally Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 90–100 (surveying
impediments faced by states seeking to regulate marijuana “due to
marijuana’s continuing illegality under federal law”).

28.

Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 223, 257 (2010) (“The federal
Lanham Act bars the registration of a trademark used on any product
proscribed by federal law, including marijuana.”); Kieran G. Doyle,
Trademark Strategies for Emerging Marijuana Businesses, 21 Westlaw
J. Intell. Prop. 1 (2014) (explaining that “the pathway toward
legitimate in the eyes of the [United States Patent and Trademark
Office] may be a rocky one” for marijuana businesses).

29.

Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 96–97 (discussing cases in which
courts have declined to enforce insurance policies and other contracts for
marijuana businesses and concluding that marijuana businesses “cannot
rely on the contracts they sign or the insurance they pay for”).

30.

Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
Vand. L. Rev. 671, 758–59 (2014).

31.

Id.

32.

Federal law enforcement officials have employed a range of tactics to try
to shut down people operating pursuant to state marijuana laws,
including asset forfeiture and civil suits. See, e.g., United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (involving a civil
suit to enjoin the operation of medical marijuana cooperatives).
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indefinitely.33 And even as a matter of policy, the dividing line
between acceptable guidance about how to use limited law
enforcement resources and a problematic de facto suspension of
federal law by the Executive is open to debate. But, at the very least,
a sustained nonenforcement policy presents difficult questions about
executive power and the rule of law.
Fourth, applying federal marijuana laws in some states but not
others might also be objectionable on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the principle of equal application of the law. Federal drug
laws are meant to apply uniformly across the country, at least as they
are currently written. Under the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy, however, a person openly selling marijuana in Wyoming continues to risk
a lengthy stay in federal prison while a person engaging in the same
conduct in Colorado can make millions. This state of affairs has
already led at least one federal judge to deviate from the penalties
recommended by the federal sentencing guidelines for marijuana. The
judge reasoned that “changes in state law and federal enforcement
policy regarding marijuana”34 warranted a reduced sentence, at least
for a distribution scheme that “bears some similarity to those
marijuana distribution operations in Colorado and Washington that
will not be subject to federal prosecution.”35
For these reasons, although the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy may
work as a temporary fix, legislators should not view it as a long-term
solution. Of course, it is also possible for the executive to change
marijuana’s status under federal law even without congressional
action by administratively reclassifying marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Under the CSA, drugs are divided into
five “schedules” based on their potential for abuse, medicinal value,

33.

As a recent Congressional Research Service report explained, “courts
have been reluctant to withdraw the executive’s discretion to decide
whether to initiate a prosecution” in the absence of “clear and
unambiguous evidence of Congress’s intent to withdraw traditional
prosecutorial discretion.” Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv.,
R43708, The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in
the Enforcement of Law 14 (2014). The Controlled Substances Act
does not contain the sort of express congressional directive that would
be likely to constrain prosecutorial discretion under current doctrine.
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012).

34.

United States v. Dayi, 980 F. Supp. 2d 682, 683 (D. Md. 2013).

35.

Id. at 689. Cf. United States v. Irlmeier, 750 F.3d 759, 766–67 (8th Cir.
2014) (Bright, J., dissenting) (“In today’s world where several states in
this country have legalized marijuana use for medical purposes and two
states have even legalized its recreational use, a hard look should apply
to marijuana prosecutions carrying mandatory minimum sentences as in
this case.”).
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and addictiveness.36 The DEA has the power to add a new substance
to the schedules, move a substance between schedules, or remove a
currently scheduled substance entirely.37 Ever since the CSA was
passed in 1970, marijuana advocates have argued that the drug is
improperly categorized in Schedule I, the strictest category, reserved
for drugs with a high abuse potential and no currently accepted
medical use.38 In 2011, the governors of Rhode Island and Washington
called for rescheduling and even suggested that the move could harmonize state and federal marijuana laws.39
Whatever the merits of rescheduling, it would not fix the state–
federal conflict over marijuana. As an initial matter, so long as
marijuana is scheduled, it would be illegal to sell the drug for
recreational use—even Schedule V substances can only be sold for
medicinal use.40 Though the CSA does permit the de-scheduling of
drugs, marijuana is exceedingly unlikely to ever qualify for complete
removal under the scheduling criteria.41 Even if it could, the CSA
requires scheduling decisions to meet U.S. treaty obligations, regardless of the criteria.42 As a result, the DEA could not remove marijuana
from the CSA without a change in the international drug treaties and,
very likely, could not move it any lower than Schedule II.43 Rescheduling marijuana might help begin to address the conflict between
36.

21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012). For an overview of the Controlled Substances
Act’s classification scheme, see, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen & Alex
Kreit, Drug Abuse and the Law Sourcebook §§ 1:1-1:16 (2014–
2015 ed.), available at Westlaw.

37.

The CSA grants rescheduling power to the Attorney General, but the
Attorney General has delegated this authority to the head of the Drug
Enforcement Administration. See Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances,
Uncontrolled Law, 6 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 332, 336 (2013).

38.

21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (providing the criteria for placing a substance in
Schedule I).

39.

See e.g., Jonathan Martin, Gregoire to DEA: Make Marijuana a Legal
Drug, Seattle Times, Dec. 1, 2011, http:/twww.seattletimes.com/
seattle-nevvs/gregoire-to-dea-make-marijuana-a-legal-drug/.

40.

21 U.S.C. § 829(c) (2012) (“No controlled substance in schedule V which
is a drug may be distributed or dispensed other than for medical
purposes.”).

41.

For this reason, alcohol and tobacco are both statutorily exempt from
regulation under the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6)
(2012).

42.

Id. § 812(b).

43.

Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 559 F.2d 735, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reporting that the DEA
concluded United States treaty commitments would permit marijuana to
be moved to Schedule II but not lower). See also Uelmen & Kreit, supra
note 36, at § 1:15.
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federal and state medical marijuana laws. But even for state medical
marijuana laws, federal rescheduling would raise as many questions as
answers. This is because state medical marijuana regimes are far more
expansive than federal oversight for Schedule II and III drugs. Indeed,
because marijuana does not have FDA approval, it is unclear that
marijuana could actually be marketed as a medicine at all even if it
were rescheduled.44
Of course, not everyone would like to see the federal government
accommodate state marijuana reforms. Those who favor marijuana
prohibition might be inclined to leave the federal prohibition of marijuana in place (though polling indicates substantial support for deferring to states, even among legalization opponents).45 If federal marijuana prohibition had been successful at blocking state medical and
recreational marijuana laws, federal marijuana prohibition might be a
viable long-term option. The trouble for would-be supporters of the
status quo is that federal marijuana prohibition has proven itself incapable of stopping state legalization laws.46
Between 1996 and 2008, the federal government unambiguously
opposed state medical marijuana laws and fought hard to block their
implementation.47 Even as recently as late 2012, a state-legal Montana
medical marijuana provider was convicted of federal charges carrying
eight decades of mandatory federal prison time.48 Despite their best
efforts, however, federal drug enforcement officials were not able to
stop states from passing and implementing medical marijuana laws.
44.

See Kevin A. Sabet, Much Ado About Nothing: Why Rescheduling
Won’t Solve Advocates’ Medical Marijuana Problem, 58 Wayne L.
Rev. 81, 82–83 (2012).

45.

Jacob Sullum, Poll Finds Most Americans Support Treating Marijuana
Like Alcohol; Even More Think the Feds Should Let States Do So,
Reason (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/01/31
/poll-finds-most-americans-support-treati (reporting on poll results in
which only about half of respondents supported marijuana legalization
but 68% said the federal government should not arrest marijuana
growers who are in compliance with state law).

46.

See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime,
62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009).

47.

Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug
Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 555, 566–70 (2010)
(providing an overview of federal enforcement efforts against medical
marijuana providers from 1996 and 2008).

48.

The defendant, Chris Williams, ultimately received a five-year sentence
after prosecutors took the extraordinary step of reducing the charges
after trial. Gwen Florio, Montana Medical Marijuana Grower Gets 5
Years in Federal Prison, Missoulian, Feb. 1, 2013, http://missoulian.
com/news/local/montana-medical-marijuana-grower-gets-years-in-federal
-prison/article_89211f90-6ca5-11e2-aa17-001a4bcf887a.html.
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To be sure, vigorously enforced federal marijuana prohibition made
life more difficult for state-legal marijuana operators, with an unlucky
few now serving federal prison sentences. But because the federal
government depends almost entirely on state law enforcement resources to enforce drug prohibition laws, it did not have the resources
to deter medical marijuana businesses from openly operating.49 As a
result, federal marijuana prohibition enforcement efforts served mostly
to make state medical marijuana laws less well controlled than they
otherwise might have been.50 Though the Supremacy Clause might
give a glimmer of hope to federal marijuana prohibition, so far courts
have largely rejected the argument that federal law preempts state
marijuana laws.51 Unless that changes, whatever one thinks about the
merits of state legalization, federal law is powerless to stop it. Nearly
two decades of experience point to the almost inescapable conclusion
that so long as states continue to pass marijuana legalization laws,
nationwide federal prohibition is not a realistic policy option. Perhaps
more than anything else, this fact is what makes federal marijuana
reform inevitable.

II. Proposals to Solve the Conflict Between
State and Federal Marijuana Laws
Though it is becoming clearer that today’s federal marijuana laws
are not sustainable—at least not without a dramatic reversal of course
at the state level—the dialogue about how to reform them should be
done is still in its infancy. To date, most proposals to change federal
marijuana law have come from state marijuana legalization supporters
and have focused mostly on minimizing or resolving the current state–
federal conflict. They fall into roughly four categories: (1) preventing
the Department of Justice from spending money to interfere with
state marijuana laws; (2) providing an affirmative defense based on
compliance with state marijuana laws; (3) letting states opt out of

49.

Mikos, supra note 46, at 1463–67 (arguing that the federal government’s
limited law enforcement resources mean that it cannot arrest and
prosecute more than a small fraction of marijuana offenders).

50.

Kreit, supra note 47, at 569–75 (arguing that federal enforcement made
it more difficult for states to effectively regulate and control medical
marijuana).

51.

See, e.g., Beek v. City of Wyo., 495 Mich. 1 (2014) (finding that Michigan’s medical marijuana was not preempted by federal law); Robert A.
Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. Health
Care L. & Pol’y 5, 37 (2013) (“[T]he CSA, properly understood,
preempts only a handful of the [marijuana] laws now being promulgated
throughout the states.”).
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federal marijuana prohibition; and (4) ending the federal ban on marijuana and replacing it with some sort of federal regulatory structure.52
To begin to make sense of the different alternatives for federal
marijuana law reform, this section considers the benefits and pitfalls
of each type of reform based on the goal of minimizing the conflict
between state and federal marijuana laws. Though this is a pressing
concern, it is hardly the only goal lawmakers might want to pursue in
crafting marijuana policy. In the next section, I will consider how
legalization opponents might view different options for reform and
take up the question of what type of legal structure would give the
federal government the most control in shaping and limiting state
marijuana laws.
A.

Reform Through Appropriations Provisos

The only successful federal marijuana reform proposal to date was
focused on spending. In spring 2014, the House of Representatives
narrowly passed an appropriations amendment to prevent the Department of Justice from spending any money to block states from implementing their medical marijuana laws. (The amendment does not apply to the legalization laws in Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington.) The Senate never voted on the provision directly, and, for
much of 2014, it seemed unlikely ever to become law. Ultimately,
however, it made its way into the final budget for 2015.53
From a political perspective, the development was groundbreaking. It marked the first congressional vote in support of easing federal
marijuana law and suggested that Congress and the President are
both now (very tentatively) inclined to permit state medical marijuana laws to go forward in some way. It also signaled just how
quickly marijuana politics is changing: the last time the amendment
came up for a vote, in 2007, it failed, garnering only 165 votes at a
time when the Democrats had a majority in the House.54
It is not hard to guess at why addressing the state–federal marijuana conflict through a spending proposal may be more politically
appealing than other options. Although polls indicate supporting

52.

See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 113–14 (summarizing
marijuana reform bills that have been introduced in Congress).

53.

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014). The appropriations act also limits
the use of funds to block industrial hemp research programs. Id. § 539.

54.

Congress Votes to End War on Medical Marijuana Patients and
Providers, Marijuana Policy Project, http://www.mpp.org/media/
press-releases/congress-votes-to-end-war-on.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2015).

700

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 65· Issue 3·2015
What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?

marijuana reform is good politics,55 many politicians still do not see it
that way.56 And, for elected officials who came up in the drug war era
of the 1980s or 1990s, an appropriations measure almost certainly
carries the least risk of giving an opponent fodder for a “soft on
crime” type of attack ad. A spending proviso is temporary. It does not
change federal law, and it can be easily omitted from the next year’s
budget. In addition, it can be framed as a question of allocating
federal resources, not necessarily a position on the merits of state
marijuana laws. Couching marijuana reform in spending terms may
also be more likely to appeal to Republican legislators, particularly
those closely aligned with the “tea party” brand. After all, cutting
federal spending is at the core of the tea party’s political identity.57
Last but not least, an appropriations amendment is much easier to
get onto the floor of the House than, say, a bill to remove marijuana
from the Controlled Substances Act, which would typically proceed
through the usual committee process.
Unfortunately, the politics is not particularly well aligned with
policy in this instance. Of all the legislative options for addressing the
conflict between state marijuana reforms and federal prohibition,
spending restrictions are almost certain to be the least effective.
As an initial matter, the spending restriction in the 2015 budget is
not a model of clarity. The provision blocks the Department of Justice
from using funds “to prevent . . . States from implementing their own
State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”58 It is far from clear that this spending
limitation applies to the investigation or prosecution of private parties
at all. If the Department of Justice were to use funds to sue a state
over its medical marijuana law or to prosecute a state official for
issuing a medical marijuana permit, that would surely qualify as
preventing the state from “implementing” its law.59 But does prose-

55.

Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S.,
Gallup (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majoritycontinues-support-pot-legalization.aspx.

56.

See Nick Wing, Here Are All the U.S. Senators and Governors Who
Support Legalizing Marijuana, The Huffington Post (Oct. 27, 2014,
10:59 AM), http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/5107508 (reporting that
only one sitting United States Senator or Governor has “announced
support for full legalization” of marijuana).

57.

Zachary A. Goldfarb, For Tea Party, Sequestration Is a Moment of
Truth, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2013 at A4 (describing federal spending
cuts as “the centerpiece” of the tea party’s economic message).

58.

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014).

59.

To date, the DOJ has not prosecuted any state or local officials for
issuing marijuana permits or sued to block a state’s marijuana law on a
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cuting a dispensary operator in San Diego mean that California has
been prevented from “implementing” its laws?60 The brief debate of
the amendment on the House floor leaves little doubt that the provision’s backers meant to stop federal prosecutors from going after
dispensary owners.61 And there is a strong argument that the text
itself prevents the Department of Justice from prosecuting any statelicensed patient or provider, whether or not the person is in compliance with state law.62 After all, a medical marijuana dispensary operator whose state-law violation would result in a civil penalty or
relatively minor criminal penalty could face years behind bars if
prosecuted federally. The state has an interest in implementing its
own laws by imposing its own penalties for noncompliance, not just in
protecting compliant operators. Still, the scope of the provision is far
from certain. Already, a handful of medical marijuana defendants
have unsuccessfully argued the provision prevents the federal government from going forward against them.63 Only time will tell how the
preemption theory, so if this is all the provision restricts, it is not
particularly far reaching.
60.

There is something of a parallel between this scenario and the federal
preemption question. State marijuana reforms do not pose an obstacle to
implementing federal prohibition because the federal government can
continue to enforce its laws criminalizing marijuana—they just have to
do it without the help of state and local officials. Similarly, one might
argue that prosecuting a private party would never prevent the
implementation of a state law. The state could still put its own law into
effect by issuing permits, regulations, and so forth, even if private
parties operating pursuant to the law risk federal prosecution.

61.

E.g., 160 Cong. Rec. H4984 (daily ed. May 29, 2014) (statement of
Rep. Titus) (explaining that under the appropriations amendment,
“[p]hysicians in [medical marijuana] States will not be prosecuted for
prescribing the substance, and local businesses will not be shut down for
dispensing the same”).

62.

See Alex Kreit, The 2015 Federal Budget’s Medical Marijuana Provision: An “End to the Federal Ban on Marijuana” or Something Less
Than That?, 35 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).

63.

See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Jurors Can’t Know Pot Growers Are Patients,
Reason (Feb. 2, 2015), http://reason.com/archives/2015/02/02/jurorscant-know-pot-growers-are-patient (reporting on motions based on the
appropriations restriction that were filed in a Washington state federal
medical marijuana case); Douglas A. Berman, Defense Moves to
Postpone Federal Marijuana Sentencing Based on New Law Ordering
DOJ Not to Prevent States From Implementing Medical Marijuana
Laws, Sent. L. & Pol’y Blog (Dec. 16, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2014/12/defensemoves-to-postpone-federal-marijuana-sentencing-based-new-law-orderingdoj-not-to-prevent-33-.html (reporting on a federal marijuana prosecution in California where the defendant argues the federal appropriations
restriction prevents the Department of Justice from continuing with the
case).
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courts interpret and apply the provision and, perhaps more
importantly, whether it is renewed in next year’s budget.
Of course, a drafting problem with the 2015 spending amendment
does not necessarily mean the idea of updating federal marijuana law
through a spending amendment is flawed. But even the most carefully
written appropriations amendment would not be a particularly effective solution to the state–federal disconnect.
First, preventing the Department of Justice from spending money
to prosecute state-legal marijuana operators would not provide any
sort of lasting immunity from prosecution. Congress could decide to
lift the spending restriction next year or the year after that. Indeed,
in the absence of “futurity” language, an appropriation proviso applies
only to the covered fiscal year and must be passed by Congress
annually to remain in effect.64 If and when the appropriations restriction were ever lifted, the Department of Justice could presumably
prosecute marijuana distributors for acts they committed during the
restricted period. Though defense attorneys might litigate the issue, it
is hard to imagine courts finding an ex post facto bar to prosecuting
people for conduct they engaged in while an appropriation limit was
in place. If Congress had intended to make it legal for state-regulated
actors to distribute marijuana, it could have amended or repealed the
Controlled Substances Act.65 A spending restriction, by contrast,
speaks only to Congress’s budget priorities. Congress might decide to
temporarily stop the Department of Justice from spending money to
investigate a class of cases when money is tight with the hope that
prosecutions will resume as soon as resources permit. For this reason,
a spending ban does not provide any more long-term protection than
the Department of Justice’s own advisory marijuana enforcement
memo.
Second, blocking federal law enforcement officials from spending
money to pursue state-compliant marijuana cases presents a difficult
logistical puzzle. At what point in a particular case does the spending
restriction kick in? If the DEA believed a state marijuana licensee was
using her permit as a cover for other illegal activity, confirming or
disconfirming that suspicion would require it to spend money on an
investigation. As a result, it is hard to imagine Congress would stop
the Department of Justice from spending money at the investigation
64.

See Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002)
(discussing the “presumption that a provision contained in an appropriation act applies only in the applicable fiscal year”).

65.

It is unlikely that the inclusion of “futurity” language would change the
equation on this point. See Atl. Fish Spotters Ass’n v. Evans, 321 F.3d
220, 225 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We caution, however, that even the presence
of [futurity] words will not establish permanence if that construction
would render other statutory language meaningless or lead to an absurd
result.”).
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stage. Even a spending limit that tried to address this issue by, say,
allowing for investigations where there was reasonable suspicion that
the target was out of compliance with state marijuana laws would tie
the Justice Department’s hands in many cases.66
On the other hand, an appropriations restriction that allowed the
DEA to investigate marijuana providers in reform states would raise a
tricky problem of its own: how would a federal prosecutor’s claim that
someone was operating on the wrong side of state law be resolved?
The most plausible answer—at a federal criminal trial—would have to
overcome the fact that compliance with state marijuana laws is not a
defense under the CSA. Ever since the DOJ released its enforcement
memo in 2009, federal medical marijuana defendants have argued they
should be allowed to introduce evidence of compliance with state law
as a defense. But federal courts have uniformly excluded the defense.67
As a result, there has been no avenue to test DOJ claims of noncompliance with state law, even in cases where the evidence of compliance
seems to be pretty strong.68 The addition of a spending provision
would certainly strengthen the argument that the issue of a federal
defendant’s state-law compliance should go to the jury. But without
an affirmative defense in the CSA itself, this would still be an awkward solution at best. Ultimately, a federal spending restriction would
seem to require choosing between a number of unsatisfactory options:
engrafting a limited “state compliance” defense onto the federal law,
blocking all prosecutions where a defendant merely claimed state compliance, or taking the federal government’s word and leaving federal
66.

If the DEA received an anonymous tip that a state marijuana licensee
was selling to children or a front for distributing other drugs, for
example, it would not have reasonable suspicion and could not spend
any money to follow up on the tip. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
274 (2000) (finding that an anonymous tip standing alone did not give
rise to reasonable suspicion). The risk that a pretrial spending restriction would deter legitimate investigations is heightened by the AntiDeficiency Act, which can result in criminal liability for an official who
makes an expenditure that has not been authorized by Congress.
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). See also J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s
Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162, 1234 (1989) (discussing the
Anti-Deficiency Act, “which prohibits any officer or employee of the
United States from making expenditures or incurring obligations either
in excess of available appropriations or in advance of appropriations,
unless he has legal authorization for making them”).

67.

See, e.g., United Sates v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (S.D. Cal.
2010).

68.

For example, federal medical marijuana defendant Charlie Lynch was
unable to raise compliance with state law as a defense. At sentencing,
however, the judge “talked at length about what he said were Mr.
Lynch’s many efforts to follow California’s laws on marijuana
dispensaries.” Solomon Moore, Prison Term for a Seller of Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2009, at A18.
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marijuana defendants who claimed to be complying with state law
defenseless.
To be sure, Congress could go further and stop the Department of
Justice from spending any money on marijuana cases in states with
medical marijuana laws. Short of that, however, it might not be
possible to completely get around the chicken-and-the-egg problem of
preventing federal agents and prosecutors from spending money on
some, but not all, medical marijuana investigations.
B.

An Affirmative Defense Based on Compliance with State Law

A second group of federal reform proposals would carve out exemptions for state-legal marijuana activity from federal prosecution.
The Truth in Trials Act, for example, would create “an affirmative
defense to a prosecution or proceeding under any federal law for
marijuana-related activities” for a defendant who could establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his “activities comply with State
law regarding the medical use of marijuana.”69 Other variants do not
use affirmative defense language, instead stating that federal marijuana laws simply do not apply to state-compliant activity, potentially requiring the government to prove noncompliance with state
law in its case-in-chief. The Respect State Marijuana Laws Act provides that federal marijuana laws “shall not apply to any person
acting in compliance with State laws relating to the production,
possession, distribution, dispensation, administration, or delivery of
marijuana.”70 A provision of the States’ Medical Marijuana Patient
Protection Act would shield those “authorized by a State or local
government, in a State in which the possession and use of marijuana
for medical purposes is legal from producing, processing or distributing marijuana for such purposes.”71
Unlike an appropriations restriction, these proposals would give
marijuana users and providers more than just temporary protection.
By amending federal drug laws, these bills would unquestionably
apply to any conduct that takes place while they are in place, even if
they were later repealed. They would also avoid the cart-before-thehorse problem that comes with spending provisos since there would be
a legislatively established process for determining state compliance.
By making federal immunity contingent on compliance with state
law, however, these proposals present their own set of challenges.
First, they would inevitably spawn difficult litigation over what con69.

H.R. 710, 113th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2013).

70.

H.R. 1523, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).

71.

H.R. 689, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (exempting from the Controlled
Substances Act people who were “obtaining, manufacturing, possessing,
or transporting within their State marijuana for medical purposes, provided the activities are authorized under State law”).
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stitutes “compliance” with state law (or engaging in activities
“authorized” by state law). In the case of users, this may be easy
enough to answer. But, in most medical marijuana states, marijuana
manufacturers and sellers are subject to a laundry list of state and
local regulations.72 A seller who failed to abide by packaging requirements or who sold marijuana to an underage customer on a single
occasion would be out of compliance with state law, at least with
respect to the affected sales. Would errors like this leave the seller
open to federal prosecution, or would substantial compliance with
state law suffice? Would noncompliance infect the legitimacy of a
defendant’s entire operation or would the defense apply on a pertransaction basis?
Second, wherever the compliance line was drawn, the federal
prosecution of noncompliant state licensees would often be at crosspurposes with state regulations. The risk of severe federal criminal
penalties (enacted to enforce marijuana prohibition) would, inevitably, undermine the state’s penalty system (enacted to regulate a
legal marketplace).73 Marijuana operators would have to account for
the fact that a misstep could result in a lengthy federal drug sentence.
This would interfere with state regulatory efforts by keeping prices
artificially high and, more important, making state-level enforcement
more difficult. A marijuana business owner who might otherwise be
inclined to self-report a regulatory violation if the penalty were a
small fine would have a strong incentive to do everything in her
power to hide it if there were a chance the penalty would be a federal
prison sentence.
C.

Letting States Opt Out of Federal Marijuana Laws

The third category of proposals would let states that met certain
requirements opt out of federal marijuana prohibition laws through a
waiver system. Opt-out proposals have not yet gained momentum in
Congress, but a handful of prominent commentators have recently
offered the idea as a politically viable middle ground between complete federal legalization and more limited measures like appropriations limits.74 Mark Kleiman and, separately, Erwin Chemerinsky,
72.

See, e.g., 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2 (2014).

73.

See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and
Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal
Law, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 745, 746 (2014) (arguing against the use
of criminal law to enforce a regulatory regime because “[t]he function
of the criminal law . . . is to enforce [a] moral code” while “the
function of the regulatory system is to efficiently manage components
of the . . . economy”).

74.

See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 114 (proposing a waiver
program as “a more incremental” step “[s]ince Congress does not yet
appear inclined to completely end or even to significantly curtail the
federal prohibition of marijuana”); see also, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr.,
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Jolene Faran, Allen Hopper, and Sam Kamin, have proposed variations on the idea of letting states opt out of a federal marijuana law.
Chemerinsky’s group recommends that the federal government adopt
“either a permissive or cooperative federalism approach” that would
allow “states meeting specified federal criteria to opt out of the CSA
provisions relating to marijuana.”75 The permissive federalism version
would entail granting states “temporary, revocable waivers” from
federal marijuana laws.76 A cooperative federalism scheme would go
beyond revocable waivers by letting “state law govern[] marijuana
enforcement within opt-out states so long as the states comply with
federal guidelines.”77 Kleiman, who was a consultant to Washington
State on implementing its legalization law,78 suggests that existing
federal law might already allow the Attorney General to enter into
contracts that would require “the state and its localities to vigorous[ly] enforce[] against [marijuana] exports in return for federal acquiescence in intra-state sales regulated and taxed under state law.”79
He argues, however, that amending federal law to permit state “cannabis policy waivers would be far cleaner conceptually” than contractual agreements that “would leave the activity in state-regulated
markets illegal under federal laws, albeit with some assurance that
those laws would not be enforced.”80

Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a FederalState Train Wreck, Governance Studies at Brookings (Apr. 2013)
(proposing a waiver policy).
75.

Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 114.

76.

Id. at 115.

77.

Id. at 116.

78.

Patrick Radden Keefe, Buzzkill, New Yorker (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/18/buzzkill
(reporting
on Kleiman’s work advising Washington’s implementation of marijuana
legalization laws).

79.

Mark A.R. Kleiman, Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy
Waivers: New Options for Federal Accommodation to State-Level
Cannabis Legalization, 6 Drug Pol’y Analysis 1, 4 (2013). See also 21
U.S.C. § 873 (2012) (providing for cooperative enforcement agreements).
Though a cooperative enforcement agreement could be drafted to operate to let states opt out of federal enforcement, it could also take a more
limited form. For example, the Attorney General could implement a
more formalized version of the DOJ’s current prosecutorial guidance for
marijuana. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 16–17 (proposing a contractual
agreement the would require federal prosecutors “take no enforcement
action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney
General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the
supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local
authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem”).

80.

Kleiman, supra note 79, at 7.
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Crafting a waiver policy would entail a number of “administrative
complexities”81 about the sort of requirements states would have to
meet to qualify and what the federal government could do to ensure
compliance. Consider the Chemerinsky group’s proposal, for example.
It would give states the opportunity to opt out of federal marijuana
law by receiving certification from the Attorney General. Certification
would be contingent on where state regulations and enforcement are
“reasonably able to prevent” a number of problems, including the
distribution of marijuana to minors, the diversion of marijuana to
prohibition states, and violence in the market for marijuana.82 Without well-defined measurable targets, however, it would be difficult to
effectively cabin the Attorney General’s discretion when determining
whether a state has met its obligations. Open-ended goals like limiting
the amount of marijuana that finds its way to other states are susceptible to wildly different interpretations.83 But broad goals might be
the only available option since it might not be possible to precisely
measure—let alone set targets for—things like the leakage of marijuana from one state to the next or the number of sales to minors.
Dealing with noncompliant states would raise an additional
challenge for any waiver policy because the federal government’s only
obvious remedy for addressing noncompliance would be far from satisfying. Revoking a waiver from federal marijuana prohibition would
simply move things back to square one—a state legalization law that
is impossible to reconcile with federal prohibition. This distinguishes
marijuana from the other regulatory regimes the Chemerinsky group
points to as successful examples of a cooperative federalism. Under
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, when state pollution plans do
not live up to federal standards, the federal government puts its own
regulations in place.84 If a state fails to set up a health care exchange
under the Affordable Care Act, the federal government fills the void
with its own exchange.85 If a state failed in its marijuana waiver
obligations, however, the federal government would not substitute its
own regulatory scheme. Instead, state failure would mean reverting to
an essentially unenforceable federal prohibition. To be sure, if the
waiver policy uniformly resulted in state compliance, the federal
government’s remedy for failure would be a nonissue. But, in the
event that a state did fall short, this would be a serious problem.
81.

Id.

82.

Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 120–21 (2015).

83.

Cf. Kleiman, supra note 79, at 7 (observing that “[t]he choice of outcome measures would be especially tricky” in any waiver system).

84.

See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 117–18 (describing the Clean
Air and Clear Water Acts as examples of cooperative federalism).

85.

Id. at 118 (discussing the cooperative federalism elements of the Affordable Care Act).
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Despite these challenges, some form of opt-out policy would create
a level of certainty that would not be possible through the use of
spending restrictions or affirmative defenses. It would eliminate the
problem of trying to reconcile federal prohibition laws with state
legalization while giving the federal government at least some measure
of control over state marijuana reforms.86 Perhaps most important, a
waiver program would give state marijuana operators certainty that
they would not face federal prosecution for conduct they engaged in
while the waiver was in effect. State marijuana operators would not
have to fear future prosecution for present state-compliant conduct
(as in the case of appropriations provisos) or that a minor violation of
state law could lead to a lengthy federal prison sentence (as in the
case of an affirmative defense based on compliance with state law).
D.

Federal Marijuana Regulation

Last but not least, Congress could rethink federal marijuana prohibition and enact its own set of marijuana regulations. If the goal is
to eliminate the conflict between state and federal law entirely,
removing marijuana from the Controlled Substances Act would be the
most straightforward solution. This type of approach could include
significant federal regulation of the legal marijuana market or not
much regulation at all. Similarly, Congress could conceivably decide
to leave federal prohibition in place in states that want it and directly
regulate marijuana in states that have legalized. Or it could get rid of
federal marijuana prohibition altogether, leaving states that want to
ban the drug to do so on their own.
The only comprehensive proposal of this sort has come from
Congressman Jared Polis with his Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act.87 Polis’s bill would enact a range of changes to federal
marijuana laws, chief among them being exempting marijuana from
the Controlled Substances Act and then transferring enforcement
authority over marijuana from the DEA to a newly renamed Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Marijuana, Firearms, and Explosives.88 Polis’s
bill would also add marijuana to two key federal alcohol statutes, the

86.

Kleiman, supra note 79, at 8 (“When states exercise their constitutional
prerogative to replace their own prohibitions with systems of regulation
and taxation (clearly preferable, in terms of the purposes of the CSA
and the international treaties, to the outright repeal of all cannabis laws
which is the states’ undoubted right), then the federal government
would be well advised to cooperate with the inevitable and attempt to
manage, rather than trying to squelch, the resulting somewhat paradoxical situation of state-licensed and state-taxed violations of federal
law.”).

87.

H.R. 499, 113th Cong. § 101 (1st Sess. 2013).

88.

Id.
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Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act.89 Though the federal
government would issue permits for people who wanted to operate
marijuana businesses under Polis’s proposal, there would be a
relatively open process for obtaining them.90 This would leave most of
the details of licensing and regulating marijuana businesses entirely
with the states.
This brief overview (which leaves out many elements of Polis’s
bill) highlights the range of issues that any proposal for federal
marijuana regulation would need to consider. Federal marijuana
regulation could look a lot like alcohol regulation, as in Polis’s bill, or
it could be much more restrictive or (less likely) more open. As
discussed below, the federal government could use its regulations to
try to limit the size of marijuana businesses to combat commercialization or to very strictly police sales to minors itself.91 For purposes
of putting state and federal marijuana laws on the same page,
however, most of these details are unlikely to matter much. Even a
relatively strict federal regulatory regime is likely to most effectively
resolve the conflict between state marijuana reforms and federal law.
This is because, regardless of the details, replacing federal prohibition
with regulation would leave states free to decide to legalize marijuana
without having to obtain a federal waiver or leaving state-legal
marijuana businesses at risk of federal prosecution. In this sort of
system, state legalization laws would not have to operate with federal
prohibition lurking in the background.

89.

Id. § 202.

90.

Id. § 302 (describing the permit process).

91.

I leave to the side the very difficult question of how medical marijuana
laws should be treated in a federal regulatory scheme. This issue presents its own challenges because medicines are regulated under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—not just the Controlled Substances Act.
Legalizing the drug for recreational purposes at the federal level would
not necessarily answer how medical-only state laws should be addressed.
Likewise, even if marijuana is legal for recreation, the government may
want to specifically regulate the marketing of marijuana as a medicine.
This might mean special restrictions or regulations on its sale as a
medicine. Or it could mean letting some patients who use marijuana as
a medicine receive insurance coverage. All of these are likely to be
particularly thorny questions at both the state and federal level going
forward since there is not a particularly good precedent for regulating a
drug that is legally accepted for both medicine and recreation. See, e.g.,
Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law
for Drug Control Policy, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 691 (2010)
(discussing the regulatory dissonance between drugs that are criminalized entirely, accepted as medicines but not for recreation, and accepted
as medicines and for recreation).
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III. Advertising, Commercialization, and
Federal Marijuana Reform
While replacing federal marijuana prohibition with regulation
might be the most effective way to bring federal law into line with
state reforms, many observers believe this type of fundamental change
to federal marijuana law is not politically viable as compared to other
options.92 Nor is resolving the conflict between state and federal
marijuana law the only goal policymakers should consider when
thinking about federal marijuana law. Lawmakers and advocates who
are opposed to or have mixed feelings about marijuana legalization
are most obviously going to be concerned with more than just how to
get out of the way of states that want to legalize the drug. At first
glance, people in this camp might seem likely to most strenuously
object to sweeping changes to federal marijuana laws. Between federal
prohibition and regulation, an affirmative defense seems like an
obvious compromise. But would a narrow approach to federal reform
actually be in the best interest of marijuana prohibitionists and
legalization agnostics?
To date, proposals in the appropriations and affirmative defense
categories have enjoyed the most political momentum. This may have
to do with the fact that a spending proviso or a limited affirmative
defense to federal prosecution would do the least damage to federal
marijuana laws. In both scenarios, Congress could leave the Controlled Substances Act and marijuana’s Schedule I status unchanged
by adopting limited exceptions. From a drafting perspective, these
would be relatively simple changes. And from a political perspective,
they might hold some appeal for tentative legislators—they give some
measure of protection to state marijuana reforms without necessarily
endorsing the idea of legalization. For similar reasons, most observers
also view a waiver or opt-out program as more politically promising
than a proposal like Polis’s. As Mark Kleiman put it, “[g]ranting the
Attorney General the authority to issue conditional and revocable (or
renewable) waivers would constitute a far less drastic devolution of
power to the states than amending the CSA to give unconditional
deference to state marijuana-legalization legislation.”93
In comparison to state waivers, affirmative defenses, and appropriations provisos, a proposal like Polis’s would represent the biggest
break from federal marijuana prohibition. Granting waivers would
allow for a logistically easy return to nationwide federal marijuana
prohibition. By contrast, replacing federal prohibition with a regula92.

E.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 114 (“Congress does not yet
appear inclined to completely end or even to significantly curtail federal
prohibition of marijuana.”).

93.

Kleiman, supra note 79, at 6.
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tory system would incorporate the idea of state marijuana legalization
into federal law in a way that would make it hard to turn back. In
this sense, federal marijuana regulation would be a concession to the
idea that existing state-level medical and recreational marijuana laws
are not going anywhere and that state marijuana legalization is a
legitimate policy option. It is understandable that many prohibitionists might not yet be ready to make this sort of allowance, especially
when most elected officials continue to oppose marijuana legalization.94 But holding onto the hope that political winds will shift—that
instead of continuing to pass reforms, states will soon begin repealing
existing medical and recreational marijuana laws—is not cost free. If
legalization opponents do not constructively engage in the dialogue
about how to fix federal marijuana laws, they risk ending up on the
sidelines. If legalization opponents were to accept that changing federal law to account for state reforms is inevitable, however, they
might find that more comprehensive reform could be in their interest
as well. Thinking about what drives opposition to marijuana legalization shows why this might be so.
While legalization skeptics have cited a range of concerns, perhaps
chief among them is the specter of a large-scale commercial marijuana
industry.95 Leading marijuana legalization opponent Kevin Sabet, for
example, argues that legalization would result in a large commercial
marijuana industry that would invest heavily in promoting and advertising marijuana.96 Sabet envisions a world in which “Big Marijuana”
is dedicated to “creating addicts” and “targeting the young.”97 To be
sure, legalization opponents worry about more than just the commercialization of marijuana. Legalization in any form would reduce prices
and increase youth access.98 But commercialization has emerged as the
leading argument against legalization. As former Secretary of Health
Education and Welfare Joseph A. Califano Jr. put it, “not only would
legalized drugs be more openly available . . . but of even greater
damage to our children would be the commercial reality that Madison
94.

See Wing, supra note 56 (“Out of 50 governors and 100 U.S. Senators
only one has announced support for full legalization of marijuana.”).

95.

See, e.g., Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana
Legalization: Room for Compromise?, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1029, 1031–32
(2013) (discussing the argument that legalization marijuana would result
in a large commercial marijuana industry).

96.

Kevin A. Sabet, A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on
Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy, 91 Or. L. Rev.
1153, 1173–74 (2013).

97.

Kevin A. Sabet, Op-Ed., Marijuana Is Now Big Business, N.Y. Times:
Room for Debate (Nov. 10, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.nytimes.com
/roomfordebate/2014/06/05/did-colorado-go-too-far-with-pot/marijuana
-is-now-big-business.

98.

Sabet, supra note 96, at 1156–57.
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Avenue marketers would be free to glamorize substances like marijuana.”99 No doubt, legalization opponents would prefer to return to
nationwide marijuana prohibition. But if, as I argue above,100 that is
not a realistic option, federal regulations aimed at limiting commercialization to the extent possible might be their second-best alternative.
Though perhaps counterintuitive, the options for reforming federal
marijuana law that seem to be the most prohibition friendly (spending provisos and affirmative defenses) are actually likely to give the
federal government less control over marijuana regulation than would
a more dramatic move. Preventing the federal government from
spending money to prosecute people who comply with state marijuana
laws or granting an affirmative defense based on state compliance
would effectively cede the details of legalization entirely to the states.
Although anyone who ran afoul of state law would risk tough federal
criminal penalties, states would have complete control over how much
(or how little) to regulate the marijuana market. A state like California, where medical marijuana dispensaries are legal but entirely
unregulated at the state level,101 would enjoy as much freedom as a
state with a finely tuned regulatory regime.
By comparison, although a waiver policy would give state
legalization laws more legitimacy than an appropriations restriction or
affirmative defense law, it would also give the federal government
much more control over shaping state law. The federal government
could demand state regulations meet certain standards in order to receive a waiver and then make renewals contingent upon satisfactory
state-level enforcement. As a result, legalization skeptics would almost
certainly find more success in furthering some of their goals through a
waiver program than they would if Congress were to adopt yearly
hands-off appropriations riders or add a state-law-compliance-based
affirmative defense to the federal code.
Federal regulation of the marijuana industry would allow for even
more federal control. The federal government could retain federal prohibition in states that want it, while simultaneously granting federal
manufacturing and retail licenses in legalization states. Federal licensure would give the federal government a number of possible methods
for containing marijuana commercialization. It could limit federal
retailers to a single license at a single location so that there is no
possibility of a marijuana version of “BevMo.” It could strictly limit
99.

Joseph A. Califano Jr., High Society 128 (2007).

100. See supra Part I.
101. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way
to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215,
43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, 69–70 (2012) (discussing the lack of state
medical marijuana regulations in California).
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the amount of marijuana each licensee could produce annually, in
effect resulting in a marijuana market made up exclusively of craft
beer–sized manufacturers.102 On this point, it is worth noting that the
CSA already has a quota system for Schedule I and II substances in
place.103 The existing quota structure is designed to limit drug
production to an amount commensurate with the “medical, scientific,
research, and industrial needs of the United States.”104 But quotas
could also be used to limit the size of commercial entities that sell
marijuana. And, in contrast to a waiver regime, directly regulating
the market would give the federal government enforcement power
over licensees. In sum, if “Big Marijuana” is one’s biggest concern
about state marijuana legalization and if state legalization cannot be
stopped, then federal regulations that would strictly limit the size of
commercial marijuana enterprises might hold a lot of appeal.
While federal regulation or a state waiver policy would give the
federal government much more control over state legalization schemes
than the current unenforceable federal prohibition or a modest affirmative defense statute, advertising is likely to remain a sticking point
for marijuana legalization opponents.105 Federal marijuana prohibition
may not be able to block state legalization laws, effectively ceding all
regulatory decisions to states that decide to legalize. Federal
prohibition does, however, allow for a complete ban on marijuana
advertising because there is no First Amendment right to advertise
the sale of an illegal good. Indeed, federal law actually makes it a
crime to advertise marijuana or any other Schedule I drug.106 To date,
the federal government has not targeted marijuana advertising in its
enforcement efforts in legalization states.107 But so long as marijuana
102. Mark Kleiman described the potential for state quotas to limit the size
of marijuana business in a white paper advising Washington State on its
state marijuana regulations. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Alternative
Bases for Limiting Cannabis Production 8 (2013).
103. 21 U.S.C. § 826(a) (2012) (requiring the Attorney General to “determine
the total quantity and establish production quotas for each basic class of
controlled substance in schedules I and II . . . to be manufactured each
calendar year to provide for the estimated medical, scientific, research,
and industrial needs of the United States”).
104. Id.
105. Sabet, supra note 96, at 1173 (“In the United States, a country obsessed
with commercialization in the name of the First Amendment, legalization is sure to be an even riskier proposition.”).
106. 21 U.S.C. § 843(c) (2012).
107. Cf. Benjamin B. Wagner & Jared C. Dolan, Medical Marijuana and
Federal Narcotics Enforcement in the Eastern District of California, 43
McGeorge L. Rev. 109, 110 (2012) (“Businesses now openly sell
marijuana and advertise their services in the newspaper, on the radio
and on television [in California].”).
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remains illegal federally, the DOJ could conceivably amend its prosecutorial guidance to advise prosecutors to target marijuana advertising while otherwise permitting state-legal marijuana businesses.
Moreover, keeping marijuana illegal at the federal level strengthens
the First Amendment case for more rigorously enforced state-level
advertising bans where the drug has been legalized,108 though the issue
has not yet been tested in court.109
If federal law were to formally recognize state legalization via
waivers or affirmative regulation, advertising bans would be on very
shaky ground. The framework for addressing commercial advertising
restrictions dates back to the Supreme Court’s 1980 Central Hudson
decision.110 Under Central Hudson, the government can ban advertising that is deceptive or that is “related to illegal activity.”111 Nonmisleading advertisements for legal goods can only be prohibited if the
government is able to (1) claim a substantial interest in restricting
the speech, (2) demonstrate that its restriction directly and materially
advances its interest, and (3) show that the restriction is narrowly
tailored to that interest.112 Though early decisions applying Central
Hudson indicated that restrictions on vice advertisements—for gambling, alcohol, and so on—might be permitted, the Court has since
“rejected the idea that the Central Hudson analysis is more lenient for
government regulation of vice product advertising.”113
Government restrictions on vice advertisements under Central
Hudson typically fail the requirements that the restriction would

108. Joseph M. Cabosky, The Advertising Regulation “Green Zone,” 5
Charlotte L. Rev. 1, 33 (2014) (observing that the federal prohibition on marijuana might provide a basis for upholding Denver’s ban
on outdoor marijuana advertising).
109. A group of publishers sued Colorado over its advertising ban but lacked
standing to pursue the claim because there was no indication retail
marijuana outlets had sought to buy advertising from them.
Trans-High Corp. v. Colo., No. 14-cv-00370—MSK, 2014 WL 585367
(D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2014) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction
but granting leave to file an amended complaint because “[t]here is no
allegation that any advertiser has been discouraged from seeking to
place advertisements with either of the Plaintiffs. Thus, as currently
drafted, the Complaint does not contain a colorable showing sufficient
for the Plaintiffs to pursue the rights of advertisers.”).
110. Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
111. Id. at 563–64.
112. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir.
2013) (describing the Central Hudson test).
113. Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial
Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8
Comm. L. & Pol’y 267, 283 (2003).
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actually advance the government’s interest and that there aren’t
narrower, non–speech restrictive alternatives. This can be true even
where advertisements appear to target an audience that cannot legally
buy the product being advertised. A recent Fourth Circuit decision
overturning a Virginia ban on advertising alcohol in college student
newspapers is instructive. The ads could not be restricted on the
theory that they involve illegal activity because “alcohol advertisements—even those that reach a partially underage audience—concern
the lawful activity of alcohol consumption.”114 Though the court
granted that the government has a substantial interest in combatting
underage drinking, it concluded that the ban was not narrowly
tailored because “roughly 60% of the Collegiate Times’s readership is
age 21 or older and the Cavalier Daily reaches approximately 10,000
students, nearly 64% of whom are age 21 or older.”115 Central Hudson
leaves room for some limits on advertisements on legal goods, of
course. A ban on alcohol advertisements in high school newspapers
would likely withstand a First Amendment challenge.116 But marijuana prohibitionists’ concerns that legalization might mean having to
allow a great deal of marijuana advertising are not misplaced.
Of course, there might be creative ways to directly limit some
marijuana advertising in the absence of federal prohibition. The federal government could attempt to devise a legal hook for advertising
limits by enacting a prohibition that it does not intend to enforce—for
example, criminalizing the use of marijuana while licensing its
manufacture and sale and allowing its possession. In theory, this may
allow for bans on marijuana advertising that promoted use. Or if the
federal government legalized only the intrastate sale of marijuana, it
could try banning advertisements that crossed state lines. Unless the
Supreme Court were to reassess its view of the commercial speech
doctrine, however, it may be impossible to put any significant restrict-

114. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc., 731 F.3d at 299.
115. Id. at 301.
116. Though it is worth noting that, in light of a recent Second Circuit case
holding that a prosecution for promoting off-label uses of prescription
drugs violates the First Amendment, even long-standing commercial
speech regulations are on potentially shaky ground. United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). See also, e.g., Constance E.
Bagley et al., Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge: Off-Label
Promotions and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 Cornell J. L. &
Pub. Pol’y 337, 339 (2013) (“The Second Circuit’s reasoning has the
potential to undermine the constitutionality of numerous areas of federal
regulation, including regulation of the offer and sale of securities under
the Securities Act of 1933; the solicitation of shareholder proxies and the
periodic reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
mandatory labels on food, tobacco, and pesticides; and a wide range of
privacy protections.”).
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ions on marijuana advertising in the absence of federal marijuana
prohibition.
For this reason, First Amendment concerns may lead prohibitionists to view appropriations restrictions as the most acceptable method
for reconciling federal and state marijuana laws. Forbidding the
executive to spend money interfering with state marijuana reforms
would leave federal marijuana prohibition untouched, thereby almost
certainly permitting bans on advertising. An affirmative defense based
on compliance with state marijuana laws or a state waiver policy
might also leave room for advertising bans, though this is less certain.
If the federal government continued to ban marijuana sales with an
affirmative defense, it is hard to predict whether the activity would
still be considered illegal under Central Hudson. Even a federal waiver
system might allow for an argument for the constitutionality of
advertising bans. Imagine a law that let states opt out of most federal
marijuana laws but not the federal law forbidding advertisements.
The federal government could also make its waivers contingent on a
state-level advertising ban. It is possible that this sort of scheme
would be enough to keep marijuana sales in the “illegal activity”
category for First Amendment purposes.
Those concerned by the idea of marijuana advertising should not
be too quick to discount federal marijuana regulation, however.
Though federal marijuana regulations would make it difficult to
directly limit marijuana advertising to adults, they might still give
prohibitionists the most effective tools for limiting the sort of
commercialization that is likely to result in extensive advertising.117
Indeed, the Supreme Court has cited the availability of “non-speech
related” policies similar to the quota options discussed above when
striking down advertising restrictions.118 In finding a Food and Drug
Administration ban on advertising compounded drugs unconstitutional, for example, the Court observed that the federal government
could limit the incentive to advertise by “capping the amount of any
particular compounded drug . . . that a pharmacist or pharmacy may
make or sell in a given period of time.”119
While marijuana legalization opponents might prefer not to think
about how to change marijuana laws, they may soon be forced to.
What sort of federal accommodation of state law might best combat
marijuana commercialization: a strict federal regulatory scheme or a
117. Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Marijuana Legalization: What
Everyone Needs to Know 155 (2012) (“The extent of advertising
would depend in part on whether the legal marijuana industry is
dominated by a few large corporations with national advertising
budgets.”).
118. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002).
119. Id.
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system that would provide for the best chance of constitutionally
banning marijuana advertising but leave all other details of marijuana
regulation to the states? This is the sort of question prohibitionists
should be considering sooner rather than later.

Conclusion
With most politicians still wary of marijuana reforms, Congress is
unlikely to reconsider federal marijuana prohibition this year or the
next. But while a change in federal marijuana law may not be imminent, it is almost certainly inevitable. Almost half of the states allow
for the medical use of marijuana, and four states have passed laws to
legalize the drug entirely. Due to resource constraints, the federal
government has proven itself unable to effectively block these state
laws by enforcing its own prohibition. As a result, in states that have
legalized the drug, federal marijuana prohibition continues in name
only. Unless states suddenly reverse course and begin recriminalizing
marijuana or the Supreme Court finds that state legalization laws are
preempted by the Controlled Substances Act—both exceedingly
unlikely events—federal marijuana prohibition’s days are numbered.
This Article compares different avenues for reforming federal marijuana laws, with the goal of highlighting some of the considerations
that might drive the debate in the coming years.
To date, efforts to reconcile federal marijuana law with state
reforms have focused mostly on relatively narrow proposals, like
forbidding the DOJ from spending money to interfere with state
marijuana laws or establishing a limited affirmative defense to federal
marijuana prosecutions based on compliance with state law. At first
glance, these proposals might seem most likely to be palatable to
legalization opponents since they would do the least cosmetic damage
to existing law. But more far-reaching reforms, like a state waiver system or federal marijuana regulation, could actually give the federal
government more control in addressing prohibitionists’ primary concern: marijuana commercialization. Meanwhile, legalization supporters
will be less likely to settle for half-measures when it comes to federal
marijuana reform as their political strength continues to rise.
While legalization opponents may understandably be hesitant to
concede ground on scaling back federal prohibition, if they wait too
long, they may find themselves on the sidelines, with the content of
federal marijuana reforms left almost entirely in the hands of legalization proponents, much like the state legalization laws themselves.
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